David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):605-609 (2012)
Studies on so-called Change Blindness and Inattentional Blindness have been taken to establish the claim that conscious perception of a stimulus requires the attentional processing of that stimulus. One might contend, against this claim, that the evidence only shows attention to be necessary for the subject to have access to the contents of conscious perception and not for conscious perception itself. This “Methodological Argument” is gaining ground among philosophers who work on attention and consciousness, such as Christopher Mole. I find that, without the supporting evidence of inaccessible consciousness, this argument collapses into an indefensible form of inductive parsimony. The Methodological Argument is thus shown to be unsuccessful when used against the claim that attention is required for conscious perception, though I suggest that it may be successful against the more ambitious claim that attention is necessary for all conscious experience.
|Keywords||attention perception inattentional blindness methodological puzzle access consciousness phenomenal consciousness chris mole ned block inductive skepticism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache (2001). Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework. Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Lionel Naccache, Jérôme Sackur & Claire Sergent (2006). Conscious, Preconscious, and Subliminal Processing: A Testable Taxonomy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):204-211.
Ned Block (1990). Inverted Earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Corns (2012). When is a Reason Properly Pragmatic? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):613-614.
Similar books and articles
Ned Block (2013). The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):170-184.
Jason Ford (2008). Attention and the New Sceptics. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):59-86.
James Stazicker (2011). Attention, Visual Consciousness and Indeterminacy. Mind and Language 26 (2):156-184.
Nicholas Shea (2012). Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):307-344.
Tobias Schlicht (2012). Phenomenal Consciousness, Attention and Accessibility. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.
Christopher Mole (2008). Attention and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):86-104.
Declan Smithies (2011). Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press 247--273.
Katalin Balog (2007). Comments on Ned Block's Target Article “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500.
F. de Brigard (2010). Consciousness, Attention and Commonsense. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):189-201.
Massimo Grassia (2004). Consciousness and Perceptual Attention: A Methodological Argument. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-23.
Neil Levy (2008). Does Phenomenology Overflow Access? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (7):29-38.
Added to index2011-02-24
Total downloads23 ( #128,632 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #289,836 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?