Simpler for evolution: Secondary representation in apes, children, and ancestors

21 (1):131-131 (1998)
Abstract Great apes show behavioural evidence for secondary representation similar to that of children of about two years of age. However, there is no convincing evidence for metarepresentation in apes. A good evolutionary interpretation should be parsimonious and must bring developmental and comparative data in accord. I propose a model based on the work of Perner (1991) and close by pointing out a logical flaw in Heyes’ second proposed experiment.
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