What we desire, what we have reason to desire, whatever we might desire: Mill and Sen on the value of opportunity
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Utilitas 18 (1):33-51 (2006)
I compare Mill's and Sen's accounts of the value of opportunity, focusing on a tension between two ideas they both uphold: that individual freedom is an important component of well-being, and that, because desires can be adaptive, actual desire is not always a good indicator of what will give well-being. The two writers' responses to this tension reflect different understandings of the relationship between freedom and desire. Sen links an individual's well-being to her freedom to choose what she has reason to desire, and looks to a democratic political process for a collective judgement about what it is rational to desire. Mill links the individual's well-being to her freedom to act on her own desires, whatever they may be, within the constraints imposed by a fair initial distribution of resources. He sees no need for collective judgement about what is ultimately valuable in human life. I side with Mill. (Published Online February 16 2006).
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Citations of this work BETA
Robert Sugden (2010). Opportunity as Mutual Advantage. Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):47-68.
Carlo Argenton & Enzo Rossi (2013). Pluralism, Preferences, and Deliberation: A Critique of Sen's Constructive Argument for Democracy. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):129-145.
Mozaffar Qizilbash (2011). Sugden's Critique of the Capability Approach. Utilitas 23 (1):25-51.
Sandrine Berges (2011). Why Women Hug Their Chains: Wollstonecraft and Adaptive Preferences. Utilitas (1):72-87.
Rosa Terlazzo (2015). Adaptive Preferences: Merging Political Accounts and Well-Being Accounts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):179-196.
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