A defence of Owens' exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims

Philosophical Studies 163 (2):453-457 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper we argue that Steglich-Petersen’s response to Owens’ Exclusivity Objection does not work. Our first point is that the examples Steglich-Petersen uses to demonstrate his argument do not work because they employ an undefended conception of the truth aim not shared by his target (and officially eschewed by Steglich-Petersen himself). Secondly we will make the point that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p is not part of the belief forming process. When an agent enters into this process of deliberation, he has not, contra Steglich-Petersen, already adopted the truth aim with regard to p. In closing, we further suggest that proponents of the truth aim hypothesis need to focus on aim-guidance, not mere aim attribution, for their approach to have explanatory utility so underlining the significance of Owens’ argument
Keywords Belief  Aim  Truth
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References found in this work BETA
David J. Owens (2003). Does Belief Have an Aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.
Citations of this work BETA
Pascal Engel (2013). Sosa on the Normativity of Belief. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624.
Similar books and articles
Conor McHugh (2012). Belief and Aims. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
David J. Owens (2003). Does Belief Have an Aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.
Daniel Whiting (2012). Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Masahiro Yamada (2012). Taking Aim at the Truth. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.
Ralph Wedgwood (forthcoming). The Right Thing to Believe. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
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