Against structured referring expressions

Philosophical Studies 146 (1):49 - 74 (2009)
Abstract
Following Neale, I call the notion that there can be no such thing as a structured referring expression ‘structure skepticism’. The specific aim of this paper is to defuse some putative counterexamples to structure skepticism. The general aim is to bolster the case in favor of the thesis that lack of structure—in a sense to be made precise—is essential to reference.
Keywords Philosophy of language  Philosophical logic  Reference  Semantics  Stephen Neale
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References found in this work BETA
Kent Bach (2007). Review of Francois Recanati, Literal Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):487–492.
Kent Bach (1999). The Myth of Conventional Implicature. Linguistics and Philosophy 22 (4):327-366.
Emma Borg (2000). Complex Demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 97 (2):229-249.

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