Against structured referring expressions
Philosophical Studies 146 (1):49 - 74 (2009)
| Abstract | Following Neale, I call the notion that there can be no such thing as a structured referring expression ‘structure skepticism’. The specific aim of this paper is to defuse some putative counterexamples to structure skepticism. The general aim is to bolster the case in favor of the thesis that lack of structure—in a sense to be made precise—is essential to reference. | |||||||||
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