Hale on caesar

Philosophia Mathematica 5 (2):135--52 (1997)
Abstract
Crispin Wright and Bob Hale have defended the strategy of defining the natural numbers contextually against the objection which led Frege himself to reject it, namely the so-called ‘Julius Caesar problem’. To do this they have formulated principles (called sortal inclusion principles) designed to ensure that numbers are distinct from any objects, such as persons, a proper grasp of which could not be afforded by the contextual definition. We discuss whether either Hale or Wright has provided independent motivation for a defensible version of the sortal inclusion principle and whether they have succeeded in showing that numbers are just what the contextual definition says they are.
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