Identity theories of truth and the tractatus

Philosophical Investigations 28 (1):43–62 (2005)
The paper is concerned with the idea that the world is the totality of facts, not of things – with what is involved in thinking of the world in that way, and why one might do so. It approaches this issue through a comparison between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the identity theory of truth proposed by Hornsby and McDowell.The paper’s positive conclusion is that there is a genuine affinity between these two. A negative contention is that the modern identity theory is vulnerable to a complaint of idealism that the Tractatus can deflect.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2005.00240.x
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
I. Kant (1984). Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.

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Citations of this work BETA
Guy Stock (2007). D. Z. Phillips and Wittgenstein's on Certainty. Philosophical Investigations 30 (3):285–318.

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