Our emotional connection to truth: Moving beyond a functional view of language in discourse analysis
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (2):193–207 (2008)
This article is a theoretical examination of the relationship between truth and forms of dialogue, in discursive psychology. To do this, I mainly draw on Bakhtin and Kiekegaard . In contrast to a hermeneutic tradition that has sidelined the importance of the author to discourse , these authors offer an understanding of truth that depends on the author's emotional connection to the truth they are expressing. They most clearly demonstrate the dynamics of our emotional connection to truth in their descriptions of different forms of speech. Kierkegaard describes the relationship between self and truth in irony, while Bakhtin does the same in the epic, the confession and the quarrel. It is my argument that these forms of speech interact with truth and help organise selfhood. I also argue that our current methodological emphasis on the function of words or the play of dominant discourses tend to overlook the experiential landscape of language and its reciprocal relationship with our subjectivity
|Keywords||Epic Dialogue Bakhtin Argument Confession Kierkegaard Irony|
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References found in this work BETA
Mark L. Johnson (1987). The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. University of Chicago Press.
Mikhail Bakhtin (1984). Problems of Dostoevskys Poetics. Univ of Minnesota Press.
Bronwyn Davies & Rom Harré (1990). Positioning: The Discursive Production of Selves. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 20 (1):43–63.
Michael Billig (1995). Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology. Philosophy and Rhetoric 28 (1):83-86.
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