Rigid designation, direct reference, and modal metaphysics
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):577–599 (2005)
| Abstract | In this paper I argue that questions about the semantics of rigid designation are commonly and illicitly run together with distinct issues, such as questions about the metaphysics of essence and questions about the theoretical legitimacy of the possible-worlds framework. I discuss in depth two case studies of this phenomenon – the first concerns the relation between rigid designation and reference, the second concerns the application of the notion of rigidity to general terms. I end by drawing out some conclusions about the relations between rigid designation, semantic frameworks, reference, and essence. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Natural kinds | |||||||||
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