David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 177 (2):261-283 (2010)
The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of its use, we encounter numerous responses to the question of “what” phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., “spatial learning”, “spatial navigation”), to representational changes (e.g., “cognitive map formation”) to terms that appear to refer exclusively to observable changes in behavior (e.g., “water maze performance”). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze have not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the sources of the different answers to the question of what. I undertake both of these tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris’s first published research study using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental learning paradigm that at best circumscribed a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes nor a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental and review literature as to what is under study in the water maze.
|Keywords||Cognition Experimental learning paradigm Mechanisms Reliability Spatial memory|
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References found in this work BETA
Carl F. Craver (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
John Bickle (2003). Philosophy and Neuroscience a Ruthlessly Reductive Account. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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John Bickle (2006). Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Synthese 151 (3):411-434.
Citations of this work BETA
Jacqueline Sullivan (2016). Stabilizing Constructs Through Collaboration Across Different Research Fields as a Way to Foster the Integrative Approach of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (00):00.
Uljana Feest (2016). The Experimenters' Regress Reconsidered: Replication, Tacit Knowledge, and the Dynamics of Knowledge Generation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 58:34-45.
Sarah K. Robins (2016). Optogenetics and the Mechanism of False Memory. Synthese 193 (5):1561-1583.
Kari L. Theurer (2013). Compositional Explanatory Relations and Mechanistic Reduction. Minds and Machines 23 (3):287-307.
Lara Huber & Lara K. Keuck (2013). Mutant Mice: Experimental Organisms as Materialised Models in Biomedicine. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (3):385-391.
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