The totality of facts

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):175–192 (2000)
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Abstract

Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, conceives the world as ‘the totality of facts’. Type-stratification threatens that conception : the totality of facts is an obvious example of an illegitimate totality. Wittgenstein’s notion of truthoperation evidently has some role to play in avoiding that threat, allowing propositions, and so facts, to constitute a single type. The paper seeks to explain that role in a way that integrates the ‘philosophical’ and ‘technical’ pressures on the notion of an operation.

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Peter Sullivan
University of Stirling

Citations of this work

Identity theories of truth and the tractatus.Peter M. Sullivan - 2005 - Philosophical Investigations 28 (1):43–62.
Ineffability and nonsense.Peter Sullivan - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):195–223.
Tractarian Form as the Precursor to Forms of Life.Chon Tejedor - 2015 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4:83-109.
Truth, Paradox, and Ineffable Propositions.James R. Shaw - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):64-104.

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