- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
An argument against spectrum inversion
In Sten Lindstrom & Par Sundstrom (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. pp. 65--94 (2002)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)Author's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
The intelligibility of spectrum inversion.Bredo C. Johnsen - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):631-6.
Spectrum inversion and the color solid.Austen Clark - 1985 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):431-43.
Intentionalism and the imaginability of the inverted spectrum.Eric Marcus - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.
Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum.Michael Watkins - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313.
Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):339-361.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
1,801 (#5,127)
6 months
132 (#25,122)
2009-01-28
Downloads
1,801 (#5,127)
6 months
132 (#25,122)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
A new inverted spectrum thought experiment.Richard Montgomery - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1963-1983.
References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-7c76586df8-hc2g5 uwo