David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (1):115-130 (2007)
“The Strong Programme” is put forward as a metaphysical theory of sociology by the Edinburgh School (SSK) to study the social causes of knowledge. Barry Barnes and David Bloor are the proponents of the School. They call their programme “the Relativist View of Knowledge” and argue against rationalism in the philosophy of science. Does their relativist account of knowledge present a serious challenge to rationalism, which has dominated 20th century philosophy of science? I attempt to answer this question by criticizing the main ideas of SSK and defending rationalism theories in modern philosophy of science.
|Keywords||truth-value of beliefs verifiability criterion logical rationality relativism|
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References found in this work BETA
David Bloor (1991). Knowledge and Social Imagery. University of Chicago Press.
Ernest Nagel (1961). The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. Harcourt, Brace & World.
Bertrand Russell (1938). The Principles of Mathematics. Journal of Philosophy 35 (7):191-192.
[author unknown] (1948). Logical Empiricism: [Foreword]. Synthese 7 (6B):457-457.
Daniel Rothbart (1998). Science, Reason, and Reality: Issues in the Philosophy of Science. Harcourt Brace College Publishers.
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