David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topoi 13 (2):117-126 (1994)
Truth-maker analyses construe truth as existence of proof, a well-known example being that offered by Wittgenstein in theTractatus. The paper subsumes the intuitionistic view of truth as existence of proof under the general truth-maker scheme. Two generic constraints on truth-maker analysis are noted and positioned with respect to the writings of Michael Dummett and theTractatus. Examination of the writings of Brouwer, Heyting and Weyl indicates the specific notions of truth-maker and existence that are at issue in the intuitionistic truth-maker analysis, namely that of proof in the sense of proof-object (Brouwer, Heyting) and existence in the nonpropositional sense of a judgement abstract (Weyl). Furthermore, possible anticipations in the writings of Schlick and Pfänder are noted.
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Maria van der Schaar (2011). The Cognitive Act and the First-Person Perspective: An Epistemology for Constructive Type Theory. [REVIEW] Synthese 180 (3):391-417.
Maria Schaar (2011). Assertion and Grounding: A Theory of Assertion for Constructive Type Theory. Synthese 183 (2):187-210.
Maria van der Schaar (2011). Assertion and Grounding: A Theory of Assertion for Constructive Type Theory. Synthese 183 (2):187-210.
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