On imagism about phenomenal thought

Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95 (2011)
Abstract
Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept *Q* (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.
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Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
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Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
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Michael Huemer (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30-55.
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