Race as a human kind

Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (1):91-115 (2002)
In this article I present a positive ontology of 'race'. Toward this end, I discuss metaphysical pluralism and review the theories of Ian Hacking, John Dupre and Root. Working within Root's framework, I describe the conditions under which a constructed kind like 'race' would be real. I contend these conditions are currently satisfied in the United States. Given the social presence and impact of 'race' and the unique way 'race' operates at differing sites, I will argue that it is site-specific, it is socially constructed, and it is real. Key Words: human kinds • metaphysical pluralism • philosophy of race • promiscuous realism • race • race theory • racial realism.
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DOI 10.1177/0191453702028001592
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Quayshawn Spencer (2015). Philosophy of Race Meets Population Genetics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 52:46-55.

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