David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Dialogue 35 (01):15- (1996)
Traditionally, the problem of defeating scepticism about the rationality of morality is that of showing that every morally required act is rationally required. Little or no direct attention has been paid to whether we must also show that it is rational for the agent to have and act from the morally appropriate motive, whatever that may be. This is not to say that philosophers have entirely ignored the issue of motives; a fair number—Kant and Aristotle come to mind—are concerned in part with the kind of motive agents ought to have and from which they ought to act. But the link to scepticism has not been clearly made. At issue is whether scepticism is fully defeated if we show that every morally required act is rationally required, even if we leave it possible that a fully rational person who performs the act just “goes through the motions” in doing so
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):448–456.
Andrew Reisner (2010). Metaethics for Everyone. Problema 4:39-64.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Summary of Moral Sketicisms. Philosophical Books 49 (3):193-196.
Robert Stern (2010). Moral Scepticism and Agency: Kant and Korsgaard. Ratio 23 (4):453-474.
Vincent Di Norcia & Joyce Tigner (2000). Mixed Motives and Ethical Decisions in Business. Journal of Business Ethics 25 (1):1 - 13.
Vincent Di Norcia & Joyce Tigner Larkins (2000). Mixed Motives and Ethical Decisions in Business. Journal of Business Ethics 25 (1):1-13.
Konstantin Kolenda (1964). Unconscious Motives and Human Action. Inquiry 7 (1-4):1 – 12.
Brice R. Wachterhauser (1985). The Problem of Evil and Moral Scepticism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 17 (3):167 - 174.
Rachel Cohon (2010). Hume's Moral Sentiments As Motives. Hume Studies 36 (2):193-213.
N. Elzein (2013). Scepticism, Responsibility and Other Prickly Topics. [REVIEW] Analysis 73 (1):107-118.
Robert Black (1989). Moral Scepticism and Inductive Scepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90:65 - 82.
David Carr (2010). Moral Madness. Philosophical Investigations 33 (2):103-125.
Michael Weber (2007). More on the Motive of Duty. Journal of Ethics 11 (1):65 - 86.
Jacqueline A. Laing (2006). A Certain Kind of Moral Scepticism and the Foundations of Human Rights. Law and Justice 157:39-53.
Added to index2010-09-25
Total downloads3 ( #620,570 of 1,906,946 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #468,570 of 1,906,946 )
How can I increase my downloads?