The nature of probability

Philosophical Studies 147 (1):89 - 102 (2010)
Abstract
The thesis of this article is that the nature of probability is centered on its formal properties, not on any of its standard interpretations. Section 2 is a survey of Bayesian applications. Section 3 focuses on two examples from physics that seem as completely objective as other physical concepts. Section 4 compares the conflict between subjective Bayesians and objectivists about probability to the earlier strident conflict in physics about the nature of force. Section 5 outlines a pragmatic approach to the various interpretations of probability. Finally, Sect. 6 argues that the essential formal nature of probability is expressed in the standard axioms, but more explicit attention should be given to the concept of randomness.
Keywords Bayesian  Physical propensity  Pragmatism  Probability  Randomness  Standard axioms
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Jacob Rosenthal (2012). Probabilities as Ratios of Ranges in Initial-State Spaces. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):217-236.
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