David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 147 (1):89 - 102 (2010)
The thesis of this article is that the nature of probability is centered on its formal properties, not on any of its standard interpretations. Section 2 is a survey of Bayesian applications. Section 3 focuses on two examples from physics that seem as completely objective as other physical concepts. Section 4 compares the conflict between subjective Bayesians and objectivists about probability to the earlier strident conflict in physics about the nature of force. Section 5 outlines a pragmatic approach to the various interpretations of probability. Finally, Sect. 6 argues that the essential formal nature of probability is expressed in the standard axioms, but more explicit attention should be given to the concept of randomness.
|Keywords||Bayesian Physical propensity Pragmatism Probability Randomness Standard axioms|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Immanuel Kant (2004). Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge University Press.
René Descartes, Ch Adam & Paul Tannery (1982). Oeuvres de Descartes. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Brian Skyrms (1990). The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Harvard University Press.
Isaac Newton (2001). Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica. Filozofia 56 (5):341-354.
Citations of this work BETA
Jacob Rosenthal (2012). Probabilities as Ratios of Ranges in Initial-State Spaces. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):217-236.
Similar books and articles
J. T. Ismael (2009). Probability in Deterministic Physics. Journal of Philosophy 106 (2):89-108.
T. V. Reeves (1988). A Theory of Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):161-182.
László E. Szabó (2007). Objective Probability-Like Things with and Without Objective Indeterminism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):626-634.
László E. Szabó (2007). Objective Probability-Like Things with and Without Objective Indeterminism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38:626.
Niall Shanks (1993). Time and the Propensity Interpretation of Probability. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 24 (2):293 - 302.
Kenny Easwaran (2011). Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):312-320.
Herbert Heidelberger (1963). Knowledge, Certainty and Probability. Inquiry 6 (1-4):242 – 250.
Added to index2009-10-12
Total downloads73 ( #65,807 of 1,902,522 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #329,673 of 1,902,522 )
How can I increase my downloads?