Understanding scientific theories: An assessment of developments, 1969-1998
Philosophy of Science 67 (3):115 (2000)
| Abstract | The positivistic Received View construed scientific theories syntactically as axiomatic calculi where theoretical terms were given a partial semantic interpretation via correspondence rules connecting them to observation statements. This paper assesses what, with hindsight, seem the most important defects in the Received View; surveys the main proposed successor analyses to the Received View--various Semantic Conception versions and the Structuralist Analysis; evaluates how well they avoid those defects; examines what new problems they face and where the most promising require further development or leave unanswered questions; explores implications of recent work on models for understanding theories; and rebuts the few criticisms of the Semantic Conception that have surfaced | |||||||||
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Paul Thompson (1988). Explanation in the Semantic Conception of Theory Structure. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:286 - 296.
Barbara L. Horan (1986). Sociobiology and the Semantic View of Theories. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:322 - 330.
Demetris P. Portides (2005). Scientific Models and the Semantic View of Scientific Theories. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1287-1298.
John Beatty (1980). What's Wrong with the Received View of Evolutionary Theory? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:397 - 426.
Sebastian Lutz (2012). On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science: A Defense of the Received View. HOPOS 2 (1):77–120.
Frederick Suppe (1972). What's Wrong with the Received View on the Structure of Scientific Theories? Philosophy of Science 39 (1):1-19.
Hans Halvorson (2012). What Scientific Theories Could Not Be. Philosophy of Science 79 (2):183-206.
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