On quantum propensities: Two arguments revisited [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 61 (1):1-16 (2004)
Abstract
Peter Milne and Neal Grossman have argued against Popper's propensity interpretation of quantum mechanics, by appeal to the two-slit experiment and to the distinction between mixtures and superpositions, respectively. In this paper I show that a different propensity interpretation successfully meets their objections. According to this interpretation, the possession of a quantum propensity by a quantum system is independent of the experimental set-ups designed to test it, even though its manifestations are not.
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Citations of this work BETA
Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer (2007). Probability in GRW Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):371-389.
Michael Esfeld (2010). Physics and Causation. Foundations of Physics 40 (9-10):1597-1610.
Albert Solé (2013). Bohmian Mechanics Without Wave Function Ontology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (4):365-378.
Mauricio Suárez (2007). Quantum Propensities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):418-438.
Mauricio Suárez (2007). Quantum Propensities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):418-438.

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