David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3):225-244 (2003)
I argue against theories that attempt to reduce scientific representation to similarity or isomorphism. These reductive theories aim to radically naturalize the notion of representation, since they treat scientist's purposes and intentions as non-essential to representation. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that similarity and isomorphism are common but not universal means of representation. I then present four other arguments to show that similarity and isomorphism are not the constituents of scientific representation. I finish by looking at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim to radically naturalize scientific representation are likely to be successful
|Keywords||Isomorphism Representation Science Similarity Structure|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Roman Frigg & Ioannis Votsis (2011). Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-276.
James Ladyman, Otávio Bueno, Mauricio Suárez & Bas van Fraassen (2011). Scientific Representation: A Long Journey From Pragmatics to Pragmatics. [REVIEW] Metascience 20 (3):417-442.
Ronald Giere (2010). An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scientific Representation. Synthese 172 (2):269–281.
Tarja Knuuttila (2011). Modelling and Representing: An Artefactual Approach to Model-Based Representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):262-271.
Elaine Landry (2007). Shared Structure Need Not Be Shared Set-Structure. Synthese 158 (1):1 - 17.
Similar books and articles
Riccardo Manzotti & Giulio Sandini (2002). What Does “Isomorphism Between Conscious Representations and the Structure of the World” Mean? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):346-347.
Anjan Chakravatty (2010). Informational Versus Functional Theories of Scientific Representation. Synthese 172 (2):197 - 213.
Adam Toon (2010). Models as Make-Believe. In Roman Frigg & Matthew Hunter (eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science. Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science.
Todd M. Bailey (2005). Rules Work on One Representation; Similarity Compares Two Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):16-16.
Steffen Ducheyne (2012). Scientific Representations as Limiting Cases. Erkenntnis 76 (1):73-89.
Steven French (2003). A Model-Theoretic Account of Representation (Or, I Don't Know Much About Art...But I Know It Involves Isomorphism). Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1472-1483.
Mauricio Suárez (2004). An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):767-779.
Steven French (2003). A Model‐Theoretic Account of Representation (or, I Don't Know Much About Art…but I Know It Involves Isomorphism). Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1472-1483.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads141 ( #6,013 of 1,102,989 )
Recent downloads (6 months)29 ( #4,308 of 1,102,989 )
How can I increase my downloads?