Semifactuals and epiphenomenalism
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Acta Analytica 16 (26):23-43 (2001)
Semifactuals and Epiphenomenalism Mental properties are said to be epiphenomenal because they do not pass the counterfactual test of causal relevance. Jacob (1996) adopts the defence of causal efficacy of mental properties developed by LePore and Loewer (1987). They claim that those who argue for the epiphenomenalism of the mental place too strong a requirement on causal relevance, which excludes causally efficacious properties. Given a proper analysis of causal relevance, the causal efficacy of mental properties is saved. I defend the counterfactual test and epiphenomenalism of the mental against this critique. In causal counterfactuals we hold everything the same, take out the causal property and see if the effect property occurs. We do not replace the causal property with a barely different property as presupposed by LePore and Loewer. But I recognize some general problems in making counterfactual claims about mental events, which raise doubts about the usefulness of the counterfactual test in general.
|Keywords||Causation Counterfactual Epiphenomenalism Mental Metaphysics Jacob, P|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Volker Gadenne (2006). In Defence of Qualia-Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.
Anthony B. Dardis (2002). A No Causal Rivalry Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 17 (28):69-77.
Paul Raymont (2001). Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant? Dialogue 40 (3):509-528.
Rex Welshon (1999). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.
Janez Bregant (2003). The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan's Causal Compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):305-320.
Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
Ivar Hannikainen (2010). Questioning the Causal Inheritance Principle. Theoria 25 (3):261-277.
Graham Macdonald (2007). Emergence and Causal Powers. Erkenntnis 67 (2):239 - 253.
Amir Horowitz (1999). Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?