David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Phronesis 47 (4):359 - 394 (2002)
'Aristotelian logic', as it was taught from late antiquity until the 20th century, commonly included a short presentation of the argument forms modus (ponendo) ponens, modus (tollendo) tollens, modus ponendo tollens, and modus tollendo ponens. In late antiquity, arguments of these forms were generally classified as 'hypothetical syllogisms'. However, Aristotle did not discuss such arguments, nor did he call any arguments 'hypothetical syllogisms'. The Stoic indemonstrables resemble the modus ponens/tollens arguments. But the Stoics never called them 'hypothetical syllogisms'; nor did they describe them as ponendo ponens, etc. The tradition of the four argument forms and the classification of the arguments as hypothetical syllogisms hence need some explaining. In this paper, I offer some explanations by tracing the development of certain elements of Aristotle's logic via the early Peripatetics to the logic of later antiquity. I consider the questions: How did the four argument forms arise? Why were there four of them? Why were arguments of these forms called 'hypothetical syllogisms'? On what grounds were they considered valid? I argue that such arguments were neither part of Aristotle's dialectic, nor simply the result of an adoption of elements of Stoic logic, but the outcome of a long, gradual development that begins with Aristotle's logic as preserved in his Topics and Prior Analytics; and that, as a result, we have a Peripatetic logic of hypothetical inferences which is a far cry both from Stoic logic and from classical propositional logic, but which sports a number of interesting characteristics, some of which bear a cunning resemblance to some 20th century theories
|Keywords||Aristotelian Logic Post-Aristotelian Logic Modus Ponens Hypothetical Syllogisms Hypothetical Syllogistic|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Susanne Bobzien (2002). Propositional Logic in Ammonius. In Helmut Linneweber-Lammerskitten & Georg Mohr (eds.), Interpretation und Argument. Koenigshausen & Neumann.
Zhongyi Zhang & Jialong Zhang (2009). The Three-Form Reasoning of New Hetu-Vidya in Indian Logic From the Perspective of Modern Logic. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):631-645.
Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2007). Human Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities: Modus Ponens and Denying the Antecedent. In Proceedings of the 5 T H International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications. 347--356.
Susanne Bobzien (2000). Wholly Hypothetical Syllogisms. Phronesis 45 (2):87 - 137.
Susanne Bobzien (1997). The Stoics on Hypotheses and Hypothetical Arguments. Phronesis 42 (3):299-312.
Susanne Bobzien (2000). Wholly Hypothetical Syllogisms. Phronesis 45 (2):87-137.
Susanne Bobzien (2002). A Greek Parallel to Boethius' de Hypotheticis Syllogismis. Mnemosyne 55 (3):285-300.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #48,044 of 1,008,729 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,209 of 1,008,729 )
How can I increase my downloads?