The Epoch of Incredulity: A Response to Katz and Olin's 'A Tale of Two Envelopes'

Mind 119 (473):159-169 (2010)
When David Lewis ( 1986 ) told us that possible worlds were a ‘paradise for philosophers’, he neglected to add that they are a minefield for decision theorists. Possibilities — be they nomological, metaphysical, or epistemic possibilities — have little to do with subjective probabilities, and it is these latter that matter most to decision theory. Bernard Katz and Doris Olin ( 2007 ) have tried to solve the two-envelope problem by appealing to possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals. In this article, I explain why any such attempt is misguided, and why we, qua decision theorists, must focus on the probable rather than the possible
Keywords Two Envelopes  Decision Theory  Probability  Counterfactual  Katz  Olin  Paradox
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 13,009
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

13 ( #136,658 of 1,410,123 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #107,970 of 1,410,123 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.