Philosophical Studies 140 (1):135 - 148 (2008)
|Abstract||In this article I introduce a certain kind of anti-realist account of what makes a property essential to an object and defend it against likely objections. This account, which I call a ‘conferralist’ account, shares some of the attractive features of other anti-realist accounts, such as conventionalism and expressivism, but I believe, not their respective drawbacks.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
William Child (2009). Wittgenstein, Dreaming and Anti-Realism: A Reply to Richard Scheer. Philosophical Investigations 32 (4):329-337.
William Child (2007). Dreaming, Calculating, Thinking: Wittgenstein and Anti-Realism About the Past. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):252–272.
Jamin Asay (2012). A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
Christian Miller (2007). The Conditions of Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:95-132.
Janet Folina (1995). Putnam, Realism and Truth. Synthese 103 (2):141--52.
Alberto Voltolini (2006). How to Get a Non-Intensionalist, Propositional, Moderately Realist Truthconditional Account of Internal Metafictional Sentences. Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):179-199.
Antti Keskinen (2012). Quine on Objects: Realism or Anti-Realism? Theoria 78 (2):128-145.
M. Gomez-Torrente (2009). Essentiality and Theoretical Identifications: Reply to Ahmed. Mind 118 (469):135-148.
Ásta Kristjana Sveinsdóttir (2010). Siding with Euthyphro: Response-Dependence and Conferred Properties. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):108-125.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads51 ( #20,569 of 549,196 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,196 )
How can I increase my downloads?