Essentiality conferred

Philosophical Studies 140 (1):135 - 148 (2008)
In this article I introduce a certain kind of anti-realist account of what makes a property essential to an object and defend it against likely objections. This account, which I call a ‘conferralist’ account, shares some of the attractive features of other anti-realist accounts, such as conventionalism and expressivism, but I believe, not their respective drawbacks.
Keywords Essentialism  Conferralism  Realism  Properties  Conventionalism
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DOI 10.2307/27734284
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.

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