David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):224-236 (2004)
The concept of intentional action occupies a central place in commonsense or folk psychological thought. Philosophers of action, psychologists and moral philosophers all have taken an interest in understanding this important concept. One issue that has been discussed by philosophers is whether the concept of intentional action is purely ‘naturalistic’, that is, whether it is entirely a descriptive concept that can be used to explain and predict behavior. (Of course, judgments using such a concept could be used to support moral or evaluative judgments about responsibility, praise and blame.) A related question is whether speakers’ views about moral and evaluative issues at least affect their judgments about intentionality, even if their explicit concept of intentional action is not itself evaluative.
|Keywords||morality values judgments intentional action intentionality responsibility commonsense thought folk psychology|
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Citations of this work BETA
Joshua Knobe (2010). Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
Florian Cova, Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob (2012). On Doing Things Intentionally. Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409.
Billy Dunaway, Anna Edmonds & David Manley (2013). The Folk Probably Do Think What You Think They Think. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):421-441.
James R. Beebe & Mark Jensen (2012). Surprising Connections Between Knowledge and Action: The Robustness of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):689 - 715.
Alessandro Lanteri (2012). Three-and-a-Half Folk Concepts of Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):17-30.
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