David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio Juris 24 (2):194-246 (2011)
According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law and Alf Ross's On Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken. The Concept of Law does not go beyond On Law and Justice in so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based on a shared understanding between participants in a project perceived by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of “acceptance” or “acknowledgement” and a “critical reflective attitude” and Ross's combination of “motivation” or “feeling” and a “coherent whole of meaning and motivation.” The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward in The Concept of Law and On Law and Justice are very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality
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References found in this work BETA
J. L. Austin (1979). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
Jules L. Coleman (1998). Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis. Legal Theory 4 (4):381-425.
Ronald Dworkin (2006). Justice in Robes. Belknap Press.
Svein Eng (2000). Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions. The Concepts of 'Descriptive Proposition' and 'Normative Proposition' as Concepts of Degree. Ratio Juris 13 (3):236-260.
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