Siding with euthyphro: Response-dependence and conferred properties

European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):108-125 (2010)
Abstract
: I argue that a response‐dependence account of a concept can yield metaphysical results, and not merely epistemological or semantical results, which has been a prevalent view in the literature on response‐dependence. In particular, I show how one can argue for a conferralist account of a certain property by arguing that the concept of the property is response‐dependent, if certain assumptions are made
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Gottlob Frege (1892/1960). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25--50.

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