Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory

Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):37-48 (2011)
Abstract
Philosophers should consider a hybrid meta-ethical theory that includes elements of both moral expressivism and moral error theory. Proponents of such an expressivist-error theory hold that all moral utterances are either expressions of attitudes or expressions of false beliefs. Such a hybrid theory has two advantages over pure expressivism, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express beliefs, and hybrid theorists can provide a simpler solution to the Frege-Geach problem. The hybrid theory has three advantages over pure error theory, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express attitudes, hybrid theorists can more easily explain moral motivation, and hybrid theorists can avoid the implausible claim that all moral discourse is radically mistaken. Accordingly, such a hybrid theory should be more attractive than pure expressivism or pure error theory to philosophers who are skeptical about moral facts and truth.
Keywords meta-ethics  expressivism  error theory  Frege-Geach problem  cognitivism  moral facts  hybrid theories  non-cognitivism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Toby Svoboda, Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
By Daniel R. Boisvert (2008). Expressive-Assertivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):169–203.
Richmond Campbell (2007). What is Moral Judgment? Journal of Philosophy 104 (7):321-49.
Philip Brown (2013). The Possibility of Morality. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):627-636.
Graham Oddie & Dan Demetriou (2007). The Fictionalist's Attitude Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):485 - 498.
Stephen Finlay (2008). The Error in the Error Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):347-369.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-03-11

Total downloads

63 ( #23,176 of 1,099,037 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #33,832 of 1,099,037 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.