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Why there is no Evidence for the Intrinsic Value of Non-Humans

Ethics and the Environment 16 (2):25-36 (2011)
The position of some environmental ethicists that some non-humans have intrinsic value as a mind-independent property is seriously flawed. This is because human beings lack any evidence for this position and hence are unjustified in holding it. For any possible world that is alleged to have this kind of intrinsic value, it is possible to conceive an observationally identical world that lacks intrinsic value. Hence, one is not justified in inferring the intrinsic value of some non-human from any set of observable properties, since that same set of properties could just as well exist in a world that lacks intrinsic value. However, since human beings do not have a faculty of intuition that would allow them to ..
Keywords intrinsic value  G. E. Moore  animals  environmental ethics
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References found in this work BETA
J. Baird Callicott (1984). Philosophical Abstracts. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (4).
J. Baird Callicott (1992). Rolston on Intrinsic Value. Environmental Ethics 14 (2):129-143.

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