A challenge to intellectual virtue from moral virtue: The case of universal love

Metaphilosophy 41 (1):152-171 (2010)
Abstract
Abstract: On the Aristotelian picture of virtue, moral virtue has at its core intellectual virtue. An interesting challenge for this orthodoxy is provided by the case of universal love and its associated virtues, such as the dispositions to exhibit grace, or to forgive, where appropriate. It is difficult to find a property in the object of such love, in virtue of which grace, for example, ought to be bestowed. Perhaps, then, love in general, including universal love, is not necessarily exhibited for reasons . This is the view that, with the help of Heidegger's notion of a fundamental emotional attunement ( Grundstimmung ), I defend. The problem is to show how universal love, and its manifestation in the virtues of universal love, can then be seen as rational. Showing this is the task of the essay.
Keywords virtue  Heidegger  arational actions  grace  Grundstimmung  universal love
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Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2012). The Virtues of Ignorance. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):335-350.
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