Journal of Semantics 27 (4):529-540 (2010)
|Abstract||This paper presents and discusses a range of counterexamples to the common view that quantifiers cannot take scope over epistemic modals. Some of the counterexamples raise problems for ‘force modifier’ theories of epistemic modals. Some of the counterexamples raise problems for Robert Stalnaker’s theory of counterfactuals, according to which a special kind of epistemic modal must be able to scope over a whole counterfactual. Finally, some of the counterexamples suggest that David Lewis must countenance ‘would’ counterfactuals in which a covert ‘would’ scopes over the whole consequent of the counterfactual, including an overt ‘might.’.|
|Keywords||epistemic modals counterfactuals force modifier scope quantifier indeterminacy Counterfactual Duality Conditional Excluded Middle|
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