Privation theories of pain

Abstract
Most modern writers accept that a privation theory of evil should explicitly account for the evil of pain. But pains are quintessentially real. The evil of pain does not seem to lie in an absence of good. Though many directly take on the challenges this raises, the metaphysics and axiology of their answers is often obscure. In this paper I try to straighten things out. By clarifying and categorizing the possible types of privation views, I explore the ways in which privationists about evil are—or should or could be—privationists about pain’s evil.
Keywords Pain  Evil  Problem of evil  Intrinsic value  Privation
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References found in this work BETA
M. B. Ahern (1971). The Problem of Evil. London,Routledge and K. Paul.
Bill Anglin & Stewart Goetz (1982). Evil is Privation. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (1):3 - 12.

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