David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Think 5 (5):31 - 35 (2003)
Hard materialism claims that the only events are physical events, involving the instantiation of physical properties in physical substances. This however omits all the mental events to which we have privileged access. Soft materialism claims that the only events are physical events and mental events involving the instantiation of mental properties in physical substances. But a list of such events would not tell us which persons had which bodies. Only dualism, which holds that the essential part of each person is a mental substance, a soul, enables us to say which person occupies which body, and so to give a full description of the world
|Keywords||Body Mind Soul|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Sarah Broadie (2001). Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):295–308.
Richard Swinburne (2009). Substance Dualism. Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):501 - 513.
Richard Swinburne (1986). The Evolution of the Soul. Oxford University Press.
Richard Swinburne (1993). Are Mental Events Identical with Brain Events? American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (April):173-181.
Stephen Yablo (1992). Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Mark Silcox, Mind and Anomalous Monism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
David M. Rosenthal (2000). Addendum to Introduction. In Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. Hackett
Markus E. Schlosser (2009). Non-Reductive Physicalism, Mental Causation and the Nature of Actions. In H. Leitgeb & A. Hieke (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos
Lynne Rudder Baker (2004). Should a Christian Be a Mind-Body Dualist? - No. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads43 ( #84,508 of 1,781,042 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #87,407 of 1,781,042 )
How can I increase my downloads?