Dualism and the Determination of Action
In Free Will and Modern Science. British Academy (forthcoming)
| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) | |||||||||
| Keywords | free will soul | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links | This entry has no external links. Add one. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Jason T. Eberl (2010). Varieties of Dualism. International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):39-56.
Gary Watson (1987). Free Action and Free Will. Mind 96 (April):154-72.
William P. Alston & Thomas W. Smythe (1994). Swinburne's Argument for Dualism. Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):127-33.
Eleonore Stump & Norman Kretzmann (1996). An Objection to Swinburne's Argument for Dualism. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):405-412.
Richard Swinburne (1996). Dualism Intact. Faith and Philosophy 13 (1):68 - 77.
Eugene O. Mills (1996). Interactionism and Overdetermination. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):105-115.
D. Zimmerman (1991). Two Cartesian Arguments for the Simplicity of the Soul. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (July):127-37.
M. Pakaluk (2003). Degrees of Separation in the Phaedo. Phronesis 48 (2):89-115.
Michael Pakaluk (2003). Degrees of Separation in the Phaedo. Phronesis 48 (2):89-115.
Richard Swinburne (1997). The Modal Argument for Substance Dualism. In The Evolution of the Soul. (Revised Edition).
Saul Smilansky (2002). Free Will, Fundamental Dualism,and the Centrality of Illusion. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Eleonore Stump (1995). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism. Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):505-531.
Sarah Broadie (2001). Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):295–308.
Monthly downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
|
Added to index2011-04-12Total downloads0Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |

