Dualism and the determination of action

In Free Will and Modern Science. OUP/British Academy (2011)
Abstract
This chapter argues that it is most unlikely that neuroscientists will ever be able to predict human actions resulting from difficult moral decisions with any high degree of probable success. That result leaves open the possibility that humans sometimes decide which actions to perform, without their decisions being predetermined by prior causes. The chapter begins with two assumptions, which provide a different framework within which to work out how far human actions are predictable from that of Frank Jackson, and which lead to a different kind of conclusion.
Keywords free will   soul
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Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0005
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Jason T. Eberl (2010). Varieties of Dualism. International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):39-56.
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