Reply to Stump and Kretzmann

Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):413 - 414 (1996)
Abstract
Stump and Kretzmann object to my argument for substance dualism on the ground that its statement involves an implausibly stringent understanding of a hard fact about a time as one whose truth conditions lie solely at that time. I am, however, entitled to my own definitions and there is a simple reason why the "standard examples" of hard facts which they provide do not satisfy my definition--they all concern instants and not periods of time
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