David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Religious Studies 37 (3):357-358 (2001)
Plantinga defines S's belief as ‘privately rational if and only if it is probable on S's evidence’, and ‘publicly rational if and only if it is probable with respect to public evidence’, and he claims that ‘it is an immediate consequence of these definitions that all my basic beliefs are privately rational’. I made it explicitly clear in my review that on my account of a person's evidence (quoted and used by Plantinga) as ‘the content of his basic beliefs (weighted by his degree of confidence in them)’, that is not the case. I emphasize ‘weighted by his degree of confidence in them’. I wrote explicitly: ‘for more or less any belief, however convinced you are of it initially, other evidence of which you are equally convinced could rend it overall improbable’. Put technically, in probabilistic terms, basic beliefs come to us with different degrees of prior probability varying with our degree of confidence in them, but a belief with a high prior probability can in the light of other beliefs of our current set have a lower posterior probability. If you continue to hold on to a basic belief when its probability on the total evidence is below half, that belief is not privately rational. Footnotes1 Note: This brief discussion arises out of Richard Swinburne's critical notice of Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief (New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Plantinga's reply in Religious Studies, 37 (2001), 203–214, 215–222.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
James Hawthorne (2009). The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer 49--74.
Richard Jonathan Sagar, The Cognitive Science of Religion/Atheism and its Impact on Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology.
Richard Swinburne (1988). Does Theism Need a Theodicy? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):287 - 311.
Jeremy Randel Koons (2011). Plantinga on Properly Basic Belief in God: Lessons From the Epistemology of Perception. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):839-850.
Michael Czapkay Sudduth (1999). Can Religious Unbelief Be Proper Function Rational? Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):297-314.
Richard M. Gale (2001). Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief. Philo 4 (2):138-147.
Alvin Plantinga (2001). Rationality and Public Evidence: A Reply to Richard Swinburne. Religious Studies 37 (2):215-222.
C. Stephen Evans (1988). Kierkegaard and Plantinga on Belief in God. Faith and Philosophy 5 (1):25-39.
Richard Swinburne (2001). Plantinga on Warrant. Religious Studies 37 (2):203-214.
Alvin Plantinga (2001). Swinburne and Plantinga on Internal Rationality. Religious Studies 37 (3):357-358.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #121,160 of 1,792,217 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #464,595 of 1,792,217 )
How can I increase my downloads?