Sobel on Arguments from Design

Philosophia Christi 8 (2):227 - 234 (2006)
Abstract
In his ’Logic and Theism’ Sobel claims that the allocation of prior probabilities to theories is a purely subjective matter. I claim that there are objective criteria for determining prior probabilities of theories (dependent on their simplicity and scope); and if there were not, science would be a totally irrational activity. I reject Sobel’s main criticism of my own cumulative argument for the existence of God that I argue illegitimately from each datum raising the probability of theism to the conjunction of all data raising that probability, since I explicitly adopted a procedure which does not commit that fallacy.
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