Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):389 – 400 (1995)
The principle of the identity of indiscernibles holds that two individuals are the same individual if they have all the same properties. There are different forms of the principle, varying with what is allowed to count as a property. An individual has thisness if the weakest form of the principle does not apply to it. Abstract objects, places and times do not have thisness. Inanimate material objects probably do not. Animate beings, and the conscious events which involve them do have thisness, and probably other events do as well
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048409512346721
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,217
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Steven French & Michael Redhead (1988). Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):233-246.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Ann Whittle (2006). On an Argument for Humility. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):461 - 497.
Peter Forrest (2006). The Operator Theory of Instantiation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):213 – 228.
Ann Whittle (2006). On an Argument for Humility. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):461-497.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Robert Merrihew Adams (1986). Time and Thisness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):315-329.
John O'Leary-Hawthorne & J. A. Cover (1997). Framing the Thisness Issue. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):102 – 108.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). Adams on Actualism and Presentism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):289-298.
Joseph Diekemper (2009). Thisness and Events. Journal of Philosophy 106 (5):255-276.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

162 ( #25,417 of 1,932,452 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

18 ( #36,777 of 1,932,452 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.