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The Modal Argument is Not Circular
Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):371-372 (1998)
Abstract
Hasker’s claim that my modal argument for substance dualism is epistemically circular is implausible. Someone can accept Premise 2 (which, Hasker claims, is the premise which generates the circularity) without ever understanding the conclusion, or without accepting Premise 3.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
On “not three gods”—again: Can a primary‐secondary substance reading of ousia and hypostasis avoid tritheism?Nathan A. Jacobs - 2008 - Modern Theology 24 (3):331-358.
On “not three gods”—again: Can a primary-secondary substance reading of ousia and hypostasis avoid tritheism?Nathan Jacobs - 2008 - Modern Theology 24 (3):331-358.
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