Theodicy, Our Well-Being, and God's Rights

Theodicy needs to show, for all actual evils e, that 1) in allowing e, a God would bring about a necessary condition of a good g not achievable in any other morally permissible way, 2) if e occurs, g occurs, 3) it is morally permissible for God to allow e, and 4) g is at least as good as e is bad. This article contributes to a full-scale theodicy by showing that A being of use (e.g., by suffering) to B is a great good for A, and that in consequence, if 1) and 2) are satisfied, 3) and 4) are also likely to be satisfied
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DOI 10.1007/BF01322949
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Michael Levine (2012). The Positive Function of Evil? Philosophical Papers 41 (1):149-165.
Robert Mark Simpson (2009). Moral Antitheodicy: Prospects and Problems. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (3):153 - 169.

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