David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 87 (3):449 - 508 (1991)
It is argued that a number of important, and seemingly disparate, types of representation are species of a single relation, here called structural representation, that can be described in detail and studied in a way that is of considerable philosophical interest. A structural representation depends on the existence of a common structure between a representation and that which it represents, and it is important because it allows us to reason directly about the representation in order to draw conclusions about the phenomenon that it depicts. The present goal is to give a general and precise account of structural representation, then to use that account to illuminate several problems of current philosophical interest — including some that do not initially seem to involve representation at all. In particular, it is argued that ontological reductions (like that of the natural numbers to sets), compositional accounts of semantics, several important sorts of mental representation, and (perhaps) possible worlds semantics for intensional logics are all species of structural representation and are fruitfully studied in the framework developed here.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Walter Ott (2016). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):131--145.
Tarja Knuuttila (2011). Modelling and Representing: An Artefactual Approach to Model-Based Representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):262-271.
Mauricio Suárez (2010). Scientific Representation. Philosophy Compass 5 (1):91-101.
Alex Morgan (2014). Representations Gone Mental. Synthese 191 (2):213-244.
Similar books and articles
Gerhard Heyer (1988). Generic Generalisations, Discourse Representation Structures, and Knowledge Representation. In Jakob Hoepelman (ed.), Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Stuttgart Conference Workshop on Discourse Representation, Dialogue Tableaux, and Logic Programming. M. Niemeyer Verlag
Robert van Gulick (1982). Mental Representation: A Functionalist View. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):3-20.
O. Shagrir (2012). Structural Representations and the Brain. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):519-545.
Uriah Kriegel (2012). Personal-Level Representation. Protosociology 28:77-114.
Gabriele Contessa (2007). Representing Reality: The Ontology of Scientific Models and Their Representational Function. Dissertation, University of London
John Dilworth (2002). Varieties of Visual Representation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):183-206.
Andreas Bartels (2006). Defending the Structural Concept of Representation. Theoria 21 (55):7-19.
Gabriele Contessa (2007). Scientific Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative Reasoning. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):48-68.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads109 ( #35,773 of 1,907,145 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #199,337 of 1,907,145 )
How can I increase my downloads?