David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):203 – 223 (1982)
That laws of nature play a vital role in explanation, prediction, and inductive inference is far clearer than the nature of the laws themselves. My hope here is to shed some light on the nature of natural laws by developing and defending the view that they involve genuine relations between properties. Such a position is suggested by Plato, and more recent versions have been sketched by several writers.~ But I am not happy with any of these accounts, not so much because they lack detail or engender minor difficulties, though they do, but because they share a quite fundamental defect. My goal here is to make this defect clear and, more importantly, to present a rather different version of this general conception of laws that avoids it. I begin by considering several features of natural laws and argue that these are best explained by the view that laws involve properties, that this involvement takes the form of a genuine relation between properties, and, finally, that the relation is a metaphysically necessary one. In the second section I start at the other end, and by reflecting on the nature of properties arrive at a similar account of natural laws. In the final section I develop this account in more detail, with emphasis on the nature of the relation between properties it invokes. Along the way several natural objections to the account are answered.
|Keywords||Property, Laws of nature, disposition, necessity|
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References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
Saul A. Kripke (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jessica M. Wilson (2005). Supervenience-Based Formulations of Physicalism. Noûs 39 (3):426-459.
Kristie Miller (2010). Contingentism in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 5 (11):965-977.
Brian Ellis & Caroline Lierse (1994). Dispositional Essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):27 – 45.
Fabrice Correia (2008). Ontological Dependence. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1013-1032.
Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Quiddistic Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):1-32.
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