David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Axiomathes 18 (1):67-89 (2008)
Intuition serves a variety of roles in contemporary philosophy. This paper provides a historical discussion of the revival of intuition in the 1970s, untangling some of the ways that intuition has been used and offering some suggestions concerning its proper place in philosophical investigation. Contrary to some interpretations of the results of experimental philosophy, it is argued that generalized skepticism with respect to intuition is unwarranted. Intuition can continue to play an important role as part of a methodologically conservative stance towards philosophical investigation. I argue that methodological conservatism should be sharply distinguished from the process of evaluating individual propositions. Nevertheless, intuition is not always a reliable guide to truth and experimental philosophy can serve a vital ameliorative role in determining the scope and limits of our intuitive competence with respect to various areas of inquiry.
|Keywords||Intuition Experimental philosophy Philosophical methodology|
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Citations of this work BETA
Hamid Seyedsayamdost (2015). On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication. Episteme 12 (1):95-116.
Albert W. Musschenga (2011). The Epistemic Value of Intuitive Moral Judgements. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):113-128.
Ben Eggleston (2014). Accounting for the Data: Intuitions in Moral Theory Selection. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):761-774.
Benedikt Löwe & Thomas Müller (2011). Data and Phenomena in Conceptual Modelling. Synthese 182 (1):131-148.
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