Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):21 – 35 (2009)
|Abstract||The assumption that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is pretheoretical is often found in the philosophical debates on consciousness. Unfortunately, this assumption has not received the kind of empirical attention that it deserves. We suspect that this is in part due to difficulties that arise in attempting to test folk intuitions about consciousness. In this article we elucidate and defend a key methodological principle for this work. We draw this principle out by considering recent experimental work on the topic by Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz (2008). We charge that their studies do not establish that the folk have a concept of phenomenal consciousness in part because they compare group agents to individuals . The problem is that group agents and individuals differ in some significant ways in terms of functional organization and behavior. We propose that future experiments should establish that ordinary people are disposed to ascribe different mental states to entities that are given behaviorally and functionally equivalent descriptions.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Justin Sytsma, Does Heterophenomenology Concede Too Much? Experiments on the Folk Theory of Consciousness.
Bryce Huebner (2010). Commonsense Concepts of Phenomenal Consciousness: Does Anyone Care About Functional Zombies? [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):133-155.
Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery (2010). Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.
Alvin Goldman (1993). Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads58 ( #20,498 of 754,747 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,372 of 754,747 )
How can I increase my downloads?