David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Realists, Platonists and intuitionists jointly believe that mathematical concepts and propositions have meanings, and when we formalize the language of mathematics, these meanings are meant to be reﬂected in a more precise and more concise form. According to the formalist understanding of mathematics (at least, according to the radical version of formalism I am proposing here) the truth, on the contrary, is that a mathematical object has no meaning; we have marks and rules governing how these marks can be combined. That’s all.
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