David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611 (2003)
I argue against the standard view that ontological debates can be fully described as disagreements about what we should believe to exist. The central thesis of the paper is that believing in Fs in the ontologically relevant sense requires more than merely believing that Fs exist. Believing in Fs is not even a propositional attitude; it is rather an attitude one bears to the term expressed by 'Fs'. The representational correctness of such a belief requires not only that there be Fs, but also that the term expressed by 'Fs' should not misrepresent them. In certain cases we might believe that there are Fs without believing our conception of Fs applies to them. This may well be the situation we are in with regard to abstract entities of various sorts
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References found in this work BETA
Jody Azzouni (1997). Applied Mathematics, Existential Commitment and the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Thesis. Philosophia Mathematica 5 (3):193-209.
John Bigelow (1988). The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
Graeme Forbes (2000). Objectual Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (2):141-183.
Bob Hale (1988). Abstract Objects. B. Blackwell.
Citations of this work BETA
Michelle Montague (2007). Against Propositionalism. Noûs 41 (3):503–518.
Alex Grzankowski (2012). Not All Attitudes Are Propositional. European Journal of Philosophy.
Matti Eklund (2005). Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):557-579.
Matti Eklund (2005). Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):557–579.
Alex Grzankowski (2013). Non‐Propositional Attitudes. Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.
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