David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):626-634 (2007)
I shall argue that there is no such property of an event as its “probability.” This is why standard interpretations cannot give a sound deﬁnition in empirical terms of what “probability” is, and this is why empirical sciences like physics can manage without such a deﬁnition. “Probability” is a collective term, the meaning of which varies from context to context: it means diﬀerent — dimensionless [0, 1]-valued — physical quantities characterising the diﬀerent particular situations. In other words, probability is a reducible concept, supervening on physical quantities characterising the state of aﬀairs corresponding to the event in question. On the other hand, however, these “probability-like” physical quantities correspond to objective features of the physical world, and are objectively related to measurable quantities like relative frequencies of physical events based on ﬁnite samples — no matter whether the world is objectively deterministic or indeterministic.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Müller (2005). Probability Theory and Causation: A Branching Space-Times Analysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):487 - 520.
Matthew Weiner & Nuel Belnap (2006). How Causal Probabilities Might Fit Into Our Objectively Indeterministic World. Synthese 149 (1):1--36.
T. Muller (2005). Probability Theory and Causation: A Branching Space-Times Analysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):487-520.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Simon Saunders (forthcoming). What is Probability? Arxiv Preprint Quant-Ph/0412194.
Kevin Nelson (2009). On Background: Using Two-Argument Chance. Synthese 166 (1):165 - 186.
Richard Swinburne (2002). Introduction to Bayes's Theorem. In Bayes’s Theorem. Oxford Univ Pr
Francoise Longy (2006). Function and Probability. Techne 10 (1):66-78.
Paolo Rocchi & Leonida Gianfagna, Probabilistic Events and Physical Reality: A Complete Algebra of Probability.
Michael Strevens (1999). Objective Probability as a Guide to the World. Philosophical Studies 95 (3):243-275.
Ellery Eells (1983). Objective Probability Theory Theory. Synthese 57 (3):387 - 442.
László E. Szabó (2007). Objective Probability-Like Things with and Without Objective Indeterminism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38:626.
László E. Szabó (2007). Objective Probability-Like Things with and Without Objective Indeterminism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):626-634.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads49 ( #92,574 of 1,937,444 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #55,098 of 1,937,444 )
How can I increase my downloads?