Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):157-171 (2002)
|Abstract||Terry Horgan has put forward an original account of truth as correct assertibility. That statement suggests that he defends some version of the epistemic conception of truth. However, this is not his intention. Horgan wants to overcome the familiar opposition between the robust correspondence theories of truth and the epistemic theories of truth by elaborating an intermediate or middle-of-the-road position. After presenting the main ideas of that position, I argue that it is less distinctive than Horgan maintains, and may be accommodated to the epistemic theories of truth, provided they are construed widely enough.|
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