Constructivism's new clothes: The trivial, the contingent, and a progressive research programme into the learning of science [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Foundations of Chemistry 8 (2):189-219 (2006)
Constructivism has been a key referent for research into the learning of science for several decades. There is little doubt that the research into learners’ ideas in science stimulated by the constructivist movement has been voluminous, and a great deal is now known about the way various science topics may commonly be understood by learners of various ages. Despite this significant research effort, there have been serious criticisms of this area of work: in terms of its philosophical underpinning, the validity of its most popular constructs, the limited scope of its focus, and its practical value to science teaching. This paper frames this area of work as a Lakatosian Research Programme (RP), and explores the major criticisms of constructivism from that perspective. It is argued that much of the criticism may be considered as part of the legitimate academic debate expected within any active RP, i.e. arguments about the auxiliary theory making up the ‘protective belt’ of the programme. It is suggested that a shifting focus from constructivism to ‘contingency in learning’ will allow the RP to draw upon a more diverse range of perspectives, each consistent with the existing hard core of the programme, which will provide potentially fruitful directions for future work and ensure the continuity of a progressive RP into learning science.
|Keywords||Philosophy History Philosophy of Science Physical Chemistry Philosophy of Science|
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References found in this work BETA
N. Mercer & D. Edwards (forthcoming). Common Knowledge. The Development of Understanding in the Classroom. Common Knowledge: The Development of Understanding in the Classroom.
Imre Lakatos (1970). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press 91-195.
Michael R. Matthews (1994). Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
Alan H. Cromer (1997). Connected Knowledge: Science, Philosophy, and Education. Oxford University Press.
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